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FOREWORD: THE LAW OF POLITICS
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER*
Figuring out an acceptable relationship between law and politics has been
one of the perennial preoccupations of both politicians and lawyers, and of po-
litical scientists and legal scholars as well.  In a country in which it has long been
the case that “scarcely any political question arises . . . that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question,” the way this question is answered has
ramifications for many issues vital to the health of our society.1
Viewed through a conventional lens, the relational issues of greatest con-
cern about these two activities, politics and law, involve politics’ influence on
law: how much is politics influencing law, whether that is a good thing, whether
that influence can be avoided and whether the political preferences of the
judges rather than some quasi-autonomous methodology of legal reasoning de-
termine legal outcomes.
One recurring worry is that politics will have too much influence on legal
outcomes.  A central ambition of the rule of law has been to insulate legal deci-
sions from political pressures.  Creating the social expectations that courts of
law ought to make decisions without regard to the social status or political
power of the litigants was one of the great developments in the history of An-
glo-Saxon jurisprudence.2  Law “ought to ignore the social status of individuals
and also to ignore their political role, unless their ability to perform that role it-
self requires some legal exemption.”3
This is a commitment that is never quite fulfilled, however.  In the past
thirty years, we have witnessed a number of high-profile battles over Supreme
Court nominees, in which traditional political battle lines were drawn up over
the nomination, leaving plenty of room for the inference that the leaders in our
political parties thought there was something political at stake in the decisions
about whom to place on the highest court in the land.  The high water mark in
the politicization of Supreme Court nominations, if that is the appropriate im-
age, was the 1986 nomination of Robert Bork.4  Soon thereafter, Clarence
Thomas’s nomination put the politically volatile issues of race and gender poli-
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1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,  I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Vintage Edition 1945, reprinted
1990).
2. For a selective rendition of the story of this accomplishment, see DON HERZOG, HAPPY
SLAVES 110-47 (1989).
3. Id. at 132.
4. See MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992) (recounting the political battles of the
Bork nomination, while also showing that issues of legal principle were also central to the fight over
that nomination).
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tics at center stage in another confirmation battle.  Subsequent to Justice Tho-
mas’s confirmation on a nearly straight party line vote of 52-48,5 the political
rhetoric surrounding Supreme Court nominations has been somewhat toned
down, but few doubt that the political parties consistently favor candidates with
distinctly different outlooks on hotly disputed social issues, including affirma-
tive action, a woman’s right to choose, school vouchers, the separation of
church and state, and the scope of federal power.
A major reason that political parties—and all people who care about public
policy—are intensely interested in who sits on the Supreme Court is, of course,
that legal decisions can have great influence on the effectuation or frustration of
political objectives.  Many an important political question does not just become
“resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question;” the judicial answer can go a
long way to resolving the political question, either by taking some previously
available policy option off the table, or by altering the ease with which options
can be achieved or even by altering the political status quo itself.
The importance of law in our society, combined with the commitment to
strive for a legal system that is at least to a degree insulated from politics,
clearly makes the influence of politics on law worthy of continual scrutiny.  No-
ticing the capacity of law to influence politics and policymaking also suggests
that scrutinizing the relationship between the two activities from the opposite
perspective also merits some of our time.  On October 11 and 12, 2001, the Pro-
gram in Public Law at Duke Law School convened its third annual public law
conference on the topic of the Law of Politics.  Its central idea was to reverse
the lens through which politics and law are commonly viewed, and to try to ex-
tend our understanding of some of the dimensions of law’s influence on politics.
The conference was held in the looming shadow of the events of September
11, 2001, but it was also held in the longer, even if less dark, shadow cast by the
decision in Bush v. Gore.6 Nowhere could anyone find a better example of how
law can directly affect politics.  By effectively halting the recount in Florida, the
Court’s decision cast Florida’s twenty-five electoral votes for George W. Bush,
giving him a majority of the electors—and the presidency.  Historians and
scholars will long debate whether that result accorded with the “actual” totals of
votes cast, or with the “actual” intentions of the voters of Florida, but no recon-
struction of ballots or voters intentions can ever change the fact that, at the time
the Court rendered its decision, no one knew what the outcome of the recount
procedures would have been, no one knew what Congress would have decided
had there been a ballot challenge during the special session convened to count
the votes, and all knew that the judicial decision in that case raised the prob-
ability of George W. Bush becoming president from something less than one
hundred percent to a certainty.
5. R.W. Apple, The Thomas Confirmation, NEW YORK TIMES, October 16, 1991, at A1 (41 of 43
Republicans voted to confirm; 46 of 57 Democrats voted to reject the nomination).
6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Sanford Levinson undertakes an analysis of the decision in a paper that was
also delivered as Duke Law School’s Currie Lecture.7  Convinced that the
“opinions offered to justify the decision to halt the Florida recount are griev-
ously mistaken as standard-form exercises in legal analysis,”8 Levinson sets out
to understand the conditions that produced the result as well as some of its con-
sequences.  Using the term “law” to refer to the results of quasi-autonomous le-
gal reasoning, Levinson concludes that one lesson from the decision is that
“law” is much less important in controlling politics than we might think.  Here
the crucial distinction is between “law” in the sense in which Levinson employs
it, and “law” in the sense of the output of legal institutions such as the Supreme
Court.  For Levinson, the lesson that the first kind of law cannot explain Bush v.
Gore counts as a reason to try to diminish the influence of law in the latter
sense.  With our constitutional culture the institution of the Court has become
too central to constitutionalism, Levinson claims, and we ought to reclaim for
other, non-judicial institutions more important roles in generating constitutional
meaning.  Others have begun to urge this course of action as well.9
Levinson understands Bush v. Gore as something more than justices just
voting to elect their preferred candidate, however.  From an institutional per-
spective, Levinson argues, the majority could anticipate that, at worst, the pub-
lic would be as divided in its opinion on the outcome as it was at the polls in
November, when Bush and Gore finished in the functional equivalent of a dead
heat.  What is more, the decision would generate many institutional friends: the
president himself, of course, and the House and Senate Republicans as well,
both for the result and for relieving the Congress of having to make the decisive
choices when counting the ballots in January, had the Court not intervened.10
“[C]onsiderations of judicial power,” he concludes, “strongly counseled doing
exactly what the Court did.”11
By focusing some of his attention on the institutional context within which
the Court acted, Levinson anticipates a topic probed directly by John Ferejohn.
Ferejohn first documents the manner in which legal institutions are deciding
more and more legislative-type questions in many governments throughout the
world.  Ferejohn wants to understand better what conditions have produced this
“profound power shift,” whereby “courts have been increasingly able and will-
ing to limit and regulate the exercise of parliamentary authority by imposing
substantive limits on the power of legislative institutions . . . have increasingly
7. Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution: A Tentative List of Some Early
Lessons, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 (2002).
8. Id. at 104.
9. E.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Mark
Tushnet, Non-Judicial Constitutional Review (manuscript on file with the author).
10. Levinson, supra note 7, at 121-24.
11. Id. at 129.
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become places where substantive policy is made [and] . . . have been increas-
ingly willing to regulate the conduct of political activity itself.”12
Ferejohn argues that institutional factors have an importance that has been
overlooked in explaining the power shift.  Quite independently of the political
ideologies being pursued, courts tend to increase in their power to constrain
legislatures, shape policy outcomes, and regulate the political process itself to
the degree that the opposing institutions are fragmented and lack the ability to
mount a coordinated opposition.  A second reason, related to the first, comes
from the courts’ willingness to protect a “wide range of values from political
abuse,” in other words, their ability to protect people’s rights.  Fragmentation
contributes to the inability of the other branches of government to act construc-
tively, creating the opening for court initiatives.  The success of those initiatives
then contributes to public receptivity to court leadership on rights, helping to
solidify the power shift.13
This last point is largely implicit in Ferejohn’s analysis, which is focused on
the conditions under which the judiciary will be in a position to produce or sup-
ply the kinds of “judicialization” of politics which he examines.  Cornell Clay-
ton’s article examines where the demand for such judicialization originates.14
Clayton does not see the power shift which Ferejohn identifies as necessarily
antithetical to democratic values, because, in his view, the Court is largely giv-
ing the American people what they want.  Opinions by the Rehnquist Court
that are hotly contested in the legal academy are, in Clayton’s view, “squarely
within the mainstream of contemporary political values and electoral prefer-
ences.”15  In area after area, such as federalism, welfare rights, and abortion, the
Court’s results “track the general direction of the elected branches or demo-
cratic opinion more generally.”16  Bush v. Gore itself may have been dramatic,
but the result can scarcely be thought radical—in an election in which the two
candidates fought to a statistical dead heat, both candidates had some claim to
victory.
Given Clayton’s view that much of the Court’s work is within the political
mainstream, it is less clear that the judicialization process presents a threat to
democracy.  “Whether the shifting of policymaking into courts . . . is democrati-
cally desirable or undesirable may have less to do with the decision-making
processes of different institutions than with the substantive policy outcomes in-
volved.”17  To the extent it is a threat to democracy, both Ferejohn and Clayton
12. John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 41, 41
(2002).
13. Id. at 55-60.
14. Cornell Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or, Why Be So
Positive About the Judicialization of Politics?), 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 69 (2002).
15. Id. at 83. Clayton’s article focuses on the American system, while Ferejohn draws on examples
from other nations as well.
16. Id. at 84.
17. Id. at 81.
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make recommendations as to what the political side of our governance struc-
tures might do to reclaim some of the policy-making role.
My own contribution to this volume sees a different problem law may be
posing for politics.18  Deliberative democracy is one of the most discussed con-
temporary political theories.  I argue that its central claim can be understood as
the claim that politics needs to become more like law.  Three central elements
of the rule of law are the aspiration that justice be blind to political or status in-
fluence, that decisions be based on reasoned argument, and that only facts and
arguments relevant to the decision being made be allowed to play a role in that
argument.  In this vein, John Rawls has argued that the Supreme Court ought to
be the exemplar of the kind of decision processes that should be used to reach
political decisions, and other deliberativists like Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson share that conception.  That conception presents an aspirational
model of legislative deliberation that is markedly different from the pluralist
models that played a large role in political theory just forty to fifty years ago.
The question of whether this is a sound model has relevance well beyond the
academy, because the obvious inability of elected officials to meet a standard of
principled deliberation seems to be a contributing factor in public cynicism to-
ward politics.
Reacting to the presence of special interest influence in the political arena,
deliberative theory argues that politics should adopt these law-like characteris-
tics.  I nonetheless argue that deliberative theory serves poorly as a theory of
politics. While specific recommendations to make specific decision processes
more deliberative are fair, the attempt to efface the distinctively non-lawlike at-
tributes of politics entirely cannot withstand scrutiny.  While this means that
politics will remain at least partially non-deliberative in its decisional proce-
dures, that result is more justified than equating the two modes of decision-
making.
Arthur Lupia’s contribution both follows and diverges from my own.19  Lu-
pia agrees that the suggestions of deliberativists to incorporate more and more
law-like precepts into politics will not achieve the ultimate ambition of delibera-
tive theory, which is to have the resolution of disputes turn on nothing but “the
force of the better argument.”20  There are, however, means to improve the civic
competence of citizens, to develop “competence-generating mechanisms [that]
advantage the force of the better argument.”21  Drawing on economics and the
cognitive sciences, Lupia undertakes to show “why, when, and how one person
can persuade another to change his or her ideas.”22  Understanding this then
permits one to turn to building mechanisms that improve civic competence, by
18. Christopher Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics Into Law, 65 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 95 (2002).
19. Arthur Lupia, Deliberation Disconnected: What It Takes to Improve Civic Competence, 65 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 133 (2002).
20. Id. at 136.
21. Id. at 145.
22. Id.
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creating conditions in which the better argument has an improved chance of
winning three battles: the battle for attention, the battle for memory, and the
battle at the precipice of choice.23  Lupia’s analysis thus strikes out in a construc-
tive direction, and one that deliberative theory may wish to endorse—not be-
cause it vindicates their description of politics as law, but because it may show
the way to accomplishing what they ultimately wish, improving the quality of
public decisions.
The essays in this volume scarcely exhaust the ways in which one might ex-
plore the influence that law is having on politics.  They open up many avenues
for further exploration, while making their own contributions to those efforts.
23. Id. at 145-46.
